U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

[redacted]

File: [redacted] Office: GUANGZHOU, CHINA Date: JUN 18 2001

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

Application: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

Public Copy

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

Identification data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Acting Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge, Guangzhou, China, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of China who was found by a consular officer to be inadmissible to the United States under § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more. The applicant married a United States citizen in January 1997 and is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative. She seeks the above waiver in order to travel to the United States to reside with her spouse and child.

The officer in charge concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed upon a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant states that the decision of the officer in charge failed to weigh all of the factors of the case and the consequences of denial, both individually and in their totality. She also asserts that her family's circumstances have changed since the denial of her request and asks that the decision to deny her request be reversed.

The record reflects that the applicant was last admitted to the United States as a K-1 fiancee on January 11, 1994. She was authorized to remain in the United States for a period of 90 days in order to marry her United States citizen petitioner, Mr. [redacted]. She did not marry Mr. [redacted] and did not depart the United States upon expiration of her authorized period of admission. In March 1996, the applicant obtained unauthorized employment at Ling Skin Care in New York, New York and on January 16, 1997, she married her current spouse. The applicant remained in the United States in unlawful status until her departure for China on or about April 8, 1999 in order to apply for an immigrant visa abroad.

Section 212(a) of the Act states:

> CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.- Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:
>
> * * *
>
> (9) ALIENS PREVIOUSLY REMOVED.-
>
> * * *

[redacted]

(B) ALIENS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

* * *

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure from the United States, is inadmissible.

* * *

(v) WAIVER.-The Attorney General has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by the Attorney General regarding a waiver under this clause.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). An appeal must be decided according to the law as it exists on the date it is before the appellate body. See Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 710-1 (1974); Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996, A.G. 1997). In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered.

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statue more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

After reviewing the IIRIRA amendments to the Act relating to fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence in the United States, and after noting the increased penalties Congress has placed on such

activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar in some instances, eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, and providing a ground of inadmissibility for unlawful presence after April 1, 1997, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud, misrepresentation and the unlawful presence of aliens in the United States.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible meaning, and that the elements to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. These factors should be viewed in light of the Board's statement that a restrictive view of extreme hardship is not mandated either by the Supreme Court or by its own case law. See Matter of L-O-G-, Interim Decision 3281 (BIA 1996).

It is noted that the requirements to establish extreme hardship in the present waiver proceedings under § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act do not include a showing of hardship to the alien as did former cases involving suspension of deportation. Present waiver proceedings require a showing of extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. This requirement is identical to the extreme hardship requirement stipulated in the amended fraud waiver proceedings under § 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(i). Therefore, it is deemed to be more appropriate to apply the meaning of the term "extreme hardship" as it is used in fraud waiver proceedings than to apply the meaning as it was used in former suspension of deportation cases.

In Matter of [redacted] Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established "extreme hardship" in waiver proceedings under § 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; (2) the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; (3) the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; (4) the financial impact of departure from this country; (5) and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

The record contains documentation, dating from December 1999 through February 2000, indicating that the applicant's spouse received treatment for constant crippling headaches which had begun in April 1999 when his wife departed the United States. A letter from a licensed social worker also indicates that the applicant's spouse was suffering from acute depression due to his wife's

departure.

On appeal, the applicant states that her husband subsequently resigned his employment in the United States in September 2000 and that he and the couple's daughter are now residing with the applicant in China. The applicant also states that her daughter has been ill on several occasions since relocating to China due to environmental pollution and weather conditions. No evidence or documentation that the applicant's daughter and/or husband are currently suffering from any significant medical problems for which treatment is unavailable in China has been submitted.

The applicant asserts that in China, she and her husband are not permitted to have a second or third child due to the "one child per family" law. However, information supplied by the Officer in Charge, Guangzhou, indicates that ". . . a child who has citizenship in another country does not count under the one-child policy, even if one or both parents is a Chinese national. . ." and that while the couple may have to apply for permission to have subsequent children in China, ". . . permission to do so will be granted when she demonstrates that any children she already has are U.S. citizens."

It should be noted that there are no laws requiring the applicant's United States citizen spouse and/or child to live abroad. Further, the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994). In Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in Matter [redacted] Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter was already living and working in the United States without authorization when she married her spouse in January 1997. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, fails to establish the existence of hardship to the applicant's spouse (the only qualifying relative) that reaches the level of extreme as envisioned by Congress if the applicant is not

allowed to travel to the United States to reside at this time. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T--S--Y--, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.